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Abstract
A problem of underground betting in a two-team sports contest is studied with
player sabotage instigated by a monopolist bookmaker. Whereas punters hold beliefs
about the teams’ winning chances correlated with Nature’s draw, the bookmaker ob-
serves this information noise-free. The enforcement authority investigates potential
match-fixing with a higher probability, the greater the upset in the contest outcome.
In such an environment, if punters do not suspect match-fixing, contests will often
be fixed by targeting the favourite, thus creating upsets and intensifying subsequent
investigations. The match-fixing result continues to hold even when punters are ratio-
nal, provided that the bookie’s beliefs are noisy: the bookie may resort to fixing by
bribing the team he thinks is the favourite, and the bettors still bet on their respective
perceived favourites.
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1 Introduction
Deliberate underperformance can occur in any contest for a variety of reasons. In many
professional sports, such as football, cricket, tennis, snooker and horse racing, alleged under-
performance under the influence of unscrupulous bettors is a common occurrence.1 Haberfeld
and Sheehan (2013) present a rich ensemble of match-fixing studies from Europe, mostly sur-
rounding football. See also Forrest and Simmons (2003) for cricket’s centuries-old association
with betting, Hill (2009) for some accounts of the fixers’ modus operandi, and Preston and
Szymansky (2003) for an insightful discussion of match-fixing and other possible cheating
instances.
In legal betting markets, corrupt influence may be spotted by bookmakers or the gambling
regulatory authority. However, in countries where gambling is illegal but people still gamble,
the bookmakers themselves can try to manipulate the outcome of a contest. Some of the
spot-fixing controversies in India’s high profile cricket league, IPL, suggest that underground
bookmakers themselves were involved in fixing (see Hawkins, 2013). News headlines such as
“Football’s authorities fighting $1 trillion crime wave powered by illegal betting markets in
Asia” suggest that illegal gambling-related corruption is too big an issue to be ignored.2
For horse races, Shin (1991, 1992) modelled the problem of insider betting in fixed odds
markets under monopoly and competitive bookmaking.3 However, insider betting has more
to do with using privileged information rather than exerting influence to alter the outcome
of a contest, which match-fixing is all about. Extending Shin’s framework, Bag and Saha
(2011, 2016) modelled match-fixing under competition and monopoly, respectively. In both
papers, the bookmakers are honest, and their pricing strategy recognizes the threat of match-
fixing coming from an anonymous punter.4 The nature of the market equilibrium and the
admissibility of match-fixing were the key focus in those two papers.
In this paper, we consider an environment where betting is organised through a secretive
network due to legal prohibition on gambling. The secret network allows the bookmaker to
not only enjoy sufficient market power, a monopoly setting, but also exert corrupt influence
1BBC online news have many such reports – http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/programmes/panorama/2290356.stm
(horse races). A recent (10 October 2016) headline, “Daniel Garza: Mexican tennis player banned for match-
fixing offence,” and similar sporting corruption news abound: http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/tennis/37698466.
Formal studies of sports corruption include those by Wolfers (2006), and Duggan and Levitt (2002).
Strumpf (2003) and Winter and Kukuk (2008) study the betting markets and discuss how betting odds may
be affected if illegal activities have occurred.
2http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/football/international/9848868/Footballs-authorities-fighting-
1trillion-crime-wave-powered-by-illegal-betting-markets-in-Asia.html
3See also Glosten and Milgrom (1985) for insider trading in financial markets and Ottaviani and Sorensen
(2005, 2008) for analysis of parimutuel betting markets.
4Konrad (2000) presents a theoretical analysis of sabotage in general contests with no reference to betting.
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on a contest if he so wishes. The contest in question is a two-team sports match, with the
bookmaker offering fixed-odds bets on either team’s win. We ask the following: Would the
monopolist stay honest or resort to corrupt bookmaking, and if he turns corrupt, what type
of contest is he likely to fix?
To answer the above question we consider two models. In our first model, the bookmaker
has the precise knowledge of each team’s probability of winning, as drawn by Nature, and
the bettors’ beliefs are noisy but correlated with the true probability. The correlation is such
that the bettors’ beliefs are distributed within a band around Nature’s draw and that the
average bettor’s belief is exactly equal to Nature’s draw. The bookie has links to corrupt
players of either team, of which the bettors are completely unaware. Thus, the bettors in
this model are naive. They stubbornly hold on to their initial beliefs. We will refer to this
model as the correlated beliefs model.
In our second model, both the bettors and the bookie observe Nature’s draw with iden-
tically distributed noise, which is modelled as a binary discrete signal. The bookie’s links
with corrupt players are not certain; he can access them only with some probability. More
importantly, the bettors in this model are rational in the sense that (i) they are aware of
potential match-fixing, (ii) they know that the bookie’s signal is noisy, and (iii) they update
their belief of a team’s winning chance using every available information including the prices.
We will refer to this formulation as the rational bettors model.
Previously, Shin (1991, 1992) and Bag and Saha (2011, 2016) used mainly naive bettors,
whose beliefs were uncorrelated with Nature’s draw but the bookie was honest. Bag and
Saha (2016) also studied strategic bettors who recognize the possibility that the bookmaker
could be indirectly complicit in match-fixing. In this paper, there are two distinct features
compared to the studies cited above. First, the bookie is directly involved in corruption.
Second, the bettors’ beliefs are not uncorrelated with Nature’s draw. Bettors still can be
naive (as in our first model) or fully rational (as in our second model). These features allow
us to study the problem in a more general environment.
 Results and intuitions. In our correlated beliefs formulation, because the bettors’
beliefs are distributed within a band around Nature’s draw, there are always some optimistic
bettors about one or the other team’s prospect, and the bookie can trade with them honestly.
However, his expected profit is likely to be low because the bettors’ beliefs are never too far
away from Nature’s draw.
Profit can significantly improve if the bookie can bribe a team and fix the match, i.e.,
reduce its probability of win and in turn widen the gap between his own belief and the
optimistic bettors’ beliefs. Then, by manipulating the prices, he can induce more bettors
to bet on the bribed team and increase his profit far above the honest bookmaking level.
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Match-fixing is even more rewarding when the target team is the favourite because then the
reduction in the probability of the bribed team’s win is proportionately greater, so much so
that almost all bettors, including the most pessimistic ones, can be induced to bet on the
bribed team.
In the rational bettors’ formulation, our main objective is to show that match-fixing
can be an equilibrium phenomenon, even if bettors are fully rational and the bookie and
the bettors have strategic interactions. We construct an equilibrium in which the bookie’s
optimal strategy is to induce bets with confounding possibilities in the bettors’ minds. The
bettors would reason, after seeing a cheap bet, that either (i) the bookie has observed a
more pessimistic signal about the concerned team or (ii) the team has been bribed. The
bookie bribes his perceived favourite, if he has obtained access to it, but does not fully
reveal through his prices whether he indeed obtained the access. In response the bettors
bet on their perceived favourite, which can be divergent due to their independent signals.
Some bettors would hope that the match has not been fixed, but others would wish the
opposite. However, we do not address the question of the optimality of match-fixing; nor
do we formally analyse the equilibrium under honest bookmaking. We restrict our task to
showing that match-fixing and rational betting can be compatible.
One key assumption of this paper is that investigation of match-fixing is exogenous,
although with different degrees of sensitivity. In the model with unsuspecting bettors, the
probability of investigation is increasing in the degree of upset in the contest outcome. In
the rational bettors model, the investigation probability is fixed. This approach is simple,
but one can extend the model to endogenous enforcement. In this regard, our analysis may
still be relevant for an important enforcement question: Should enforcement be outcome
dependent, say, investigate only if there is a big upset? A recent work by Chassang and
Miquel (2013) on principal-agent with a whistleblower monitor reporting agent-corruption
has argued that enforcement should not be too sensitive to whistleblower’s report because
that would encourage the agent to retaliate against the whistleblower. In our context, in
the absence of a whistleblower, that may not be the case; making investigation more likely
for a bigger upset should weaken the incentive for corruption, thus supporting conventional
wisdom on monitoring.
In Section 2, we present the model. The main analysis appears in Sections 3 and 4.
Section 5 explains how our model assumptions can be relaxed before discussing some policy
implications. An appendix contains several proofs. A supplementary file reports the formal
argument behind Proposition 5, the main result in Section 4.
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2 The Model
The most likely scenario of our model is the one where gambling is illegal and betting is
organised through a secretive and personalized network, thus giving rise to a captive (i.e.,
monopoly) market. The sole bookmaker, called the bookie, sets odds on each of two teams
winning a contest, a sports match for example. Odds setting is equivalent to setting the
prices of two tickets; ticket i with price pii yields a dollar if team i wins the contest and
yields nothing if team i loses. The match being drawn is not a possibility (by assumption).
Later on, we discuss a likely modification of our model if draw is permitted.
In the absence of any external influence, the probability that team 1 will win, as drawn
by Nature, is p1. This probability is precisely known to the bookie, the competing players
and the enforcement authority.5
Both teams have some corrupt players who are willing to underperform for secret mone-
tary gains. The bookmaker has links with the corrupt players and may bribe a team of his
choice to reduce its probability of winning from pi to λpi, 0 ≤ λ < 1, where λ is exogenously
given.6 After fixing the match, the bookie posts the prices, following which the punters bet.
There are a continuum of punters of mass 1, who do not suspect any foul play and go
by their private signal or belief q of team 1’s winning probability. The private signal is
drawn from an interval [p1 − δ, p1 + δ] where 0 < δ < 1/2. The punters’ beliefs, although
imprecise, are correlated with Nature’s draw. Both Individually and collectively, punters
have one dollar to bet.
We assume the distribution of q to be uniform; that is, its density function is 1
2δ
over
the interval [p1− δ, p1+ δ], yielding the mean belief precisely p1, i.e., on average the market
is accurate. However, for consistency, this density function applies only to the interval
δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1 − δ. For p1 outside this interval, the density function is modified. For p1 < δ,
the support is [0, p1+ δ) and the density is 1/(p1+ δ), and for p1 > 1− δ they are (p1− δ, 1]
and 1/(p2 + δ), respectively.
Throughout, we prevent ‘free money’ by imposing the following Dutch-book restriction,
which rules out splitting the total wager on two bets to ensure a certain win:
Assumption 1. The bookie must choose prices 0 ≤ pi1, pi2 ≤ 1 such that pi1 + pi2 ≥ 1.
 Enforcement and penalties. An enforcement authority is aware of likely illegal sports
betting and match-fixing. It acts on random tip-off that may be received with a fixed
5By assumption, the bookie is skilful in predicting the match outcome, as noted by Levitt (2004).
6λ can be made endogenous by allowing sabotage to be sensitive to the bribe amount. For a cleaner
treatment, we do not take this approach.
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probability 0 < α0 < 1. The enforcement then imposes an ex post penalty s
′
B on the bookie
(a fine or prison term).7 We denote α0s
′
B by s. For match-fixing and bribery, we consider a
more responsive enforcement (still exogenous) as follows:
Following the sporting contest, the authority investigates only the losing team i with
probability αi(p1), where α
′
1(p1) ≥ 0 and α ′2(p1) ≤ 0. Upon investigation, match-fixing and
bribery are uncovered with certainty.
In fact, we will use the following linear form for the αi(p1) function:
Assumption 2. α1(p1) = α+ γp1 ≤ 1 and α2(p1) = α+ (1− p1)γ ≤ 1, where α ≥ 0 and
γ ≥ 0.
Further, given the underground nature of betting, it is not very plausible to let αi(.)
depend on betting odds or λ. Later, we comment on making αi(.) sensitive to betting odds.
After match-fixing is uncovered, both the bookie and the participating players are fined.
The players’ fine is sP. The bookie’s fine includes a specific fine for match-fixing f and also
s ′B, if the illegal act of organising betting has not been uncovered separately. Thus, the
expected fine of the bookie from the match-fixing investigation is sB = f+ (1− α0)s
′
B. This
leads to an expected overall penalty of organising betting and match-fixing (by team i) as
(1− λpi)αi(p1)[f+ (1− α0)s
′
B] + α0s
′
B ≡ (1− λpi)αi(p1)sB + s.
 Bribery. There are several issues regarding bribery. First, how should the match-fixing
agreement be enforced? Second, should bribe be paid beforehand or afterwards? Third, how
much bribe is to be paid? To address these issues, we take the approach of paying the bribe
ex post, only if the contacted team loses. The amount to be paid is agreed ex ante, and we
assume that the bookie can commit to honour his promise. The amount of bribe is decided
by the bookie as a first-and-final offer. Later, we show that to a large extent, our qualitative
results will survive, even if we allow bargaining or if the bribe is paid beforehand.
The arrangement of paying the bribe ex post makes the underperformance incentive
compatible for a corrupt player. Without loss of generality, consider the case of bribing
team 1. By underperforming and losing, the corrupt player receives a bribe B but forgoes a
prize money w, and with probability α1(p1), he will have to pay sP as a fine. In contrast, by
not underperforming (i.e., by cheating on the bookie), he will receive w with probability p1
and B with probability (1− p1) with some risk of detection. Underperformance is incentive
7Alternative modes of discovery are also possible – a raid or surveillance by the enforcement authority.
We do not consider them. In any case, we do not model the authority’s enforcement decision.
5
compatible if
(1− λp1)[B− α1(p1)sP] + λp1w ≥ (1− p1)[B− α1(p1)sP] + p1w
or, B ≥ w+ α1(p1)sP.
We set B1 = w+ α1(p1)sP as bribe for team 1. Likewise, B2 = w+ α2(p1)sP for team 2.
 Bribery game Γ . We now describe the bribery game.
Stage 1. Nature draws p1 and reveals it to the bookie, the players and the enforcement
authority; and the punters draw their respective private signals q, which is correlated to p1.
Stage 2. The bookie decides whether to engage in match-fixing.
Stage 3. Prices (pi1, pi2) are set for the tickets on respective team’s win; 0 ≤ pi1, pi2 ≤ 1.
Stage 4. Punters place bets according to their beliefs. The match is played out according
to the winning probabilities (p1, 1 − p1) or (λp1, 1 − λp1) (where team 1 is bribed), or
(1− λp2, λp2) (where team 2 is bribed) and the match outcome is realised.
Stage 5. Finally, the enforcement authority follows its investigation policy. ||
For comparison with a different formulation in Section 4, we also draw the following time
line of the game Γ :
p1 drawn q drawn which team prices posted match outcome investigate
• • • • • • •
bookie learns to bribe? bets placed bets settled penalties
p1
Figure 1: Time line
3 To Bribe or not to Bribe?
We now analyse the bookie’s decision problem regarding which team to bribe, which contests
to fix and what prices to set. In setting the prices, the bookie must consider the punters’
betting behaviour.
Punters’ betting decision. The risk-neutral punters maximise their expected return by
the following rule: Bet on team 1 if and only if q
pi1
≥ max{ 1−q
pi2
, 1}; bet on team 2 if and only
if 1−q
pi2
≥ max{ q
pi1
, 1}.
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To elaborate, when prices (pi1, pi2) are such that pi1 ≤ p1+ δ and 1−pi2 ≥ p1− δ, punters
with q ∈ [pi1, p1 + δ] bet on team 1, punters with q ∈ [p1 − δ, 1 − pi2] bet on team 2, and
the remaining punters whose beliefs fall between 1 − pi2 and pi1 do not bet (this interval is
non-empty due to Assumption 1).
Combining the punters’ betting rule and the distribution of their beliefs, we write the
market shares or the mass of bettors betting on team 1 and team 2, respectively, as
n1 =

p1+δ−pi1
p1+δ
, ∀p1 ∈ [0, δ)
p1+δ−pi1
2δ , ∀p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ]
1−pi1
1−p1+δ
, ∀p1 ∈ (1− δ, 1],
n2 =

1−pi2
p1+δ
, ∀p1 ∈ [0, δ)
1−pi2−p1+δ
2δ , ∀p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ]
1−pi2−p1+δ
1−p1+δ
, ∀p1 ∈ (1− δ, 1].
(1)
 Honest bookmaking. We first consider honest bookmaking. The bookie solves the
following profit maximisation problem:
max
pi1,pi2
EΠ ≡ EΠ0 − α0s ′B =
[
n1(pi1)(1−
p1
pi1
) + n2(pi2)(1−
p2
pi2
)
]
− s (2)
subject to
max {0, p1 − δ} ≤ pi1 ≤ min {p1 + δ, 1},
max {0, p1 − δ} ≤ 1− pi2 ≤ min {p1 + δ, 1},
pi1 + pi2 ≥ 1.
(3)
The first constraint in (3) acknowledges that pi1 should not be set below p1 − δ because
that would be wasteful. At the same time, pi1 must not be set above p1 + δ for the market
share of the bets on team 1 to be positive. The second constraint applies the same logic
to pi2 vis-a`-vis the market share of the bets on team 2. The third one is the Dutch-book
restriction.
While we assume 0 < δ < 1/2, it will be helpful to restrict δ below a critical level δ^ so
the bookie’s profit curve (as derived in the proof of Proposition 1) will be well-behaved at
all p1, including p1 ≤ δ and p1 ≥ 1− δ.
Assumption 3. 0 < δ < δ^ = 0.376, where δ^ solves 2(
√
2− 1) − (2
√
2− 1)δ− δ2 = 0.
The solution to the bookie’s problem is given in Proposition 1. It suggests that the
optimal prices will generally be unconstrainted at all p1, except at very high and very low
values. Furthermore, of the two bounds on the two prices (i.e., the first two constraints of
(3)), only the upper bound may bind on pi1, and only the lower bound may bind on 1− pi2.
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Proposition 1. The optimal prices under honest bookmaking are
pi01 =
{ √
p1(p1 + δ), ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1− δ)√
p1, ∀p1 ∈ [1− δ, 1],
pi02 =
{ √
p2, ∀p1 ∈ [0, δ)√
p2(p2 + δ) ∀p1 ∈ [δ, 1],
(4)
resulting in the following profit:
EΠ0 =

1
p1+δ
[
2+ p1 + δ− 2
√
p1(p1 + δ) − 2
√
p2
]
− s for p1 < δ
1
δ
[
1+ δ−
√
p1(p1 + δ) −
√
p2(p2 + δ)
]
− s for δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1− δ
1
p2+δ
[
2+ p2 + δ− 2
√
p1 − 2
√
p2(p2 + δ)
]
− s for 1− δ < p1.
(5)
EΠ0 is symmetric and U-shaped with its minimum occurring at p1 = 1/2.
The explanation for the U-shaped profit curve is that when the contests are very uneven,
the bookie offers the bettors a low return on the favourite and a high return on the longshot.
However, because the probability of paying out on the longshot is also low, the overall
expected profit is dictated by the low return on the favourite. This explains the increasing
segment of EΠb for p1 > 1/2. In contrast, when the contests are near-even, almost equal
bets are placed on both sides, with comparable chances of paying out on either of them.
Hence, profit falls to a minimum.
While retaining the same shape as that of Shin (1991), our profit curve will be flatter in
the middle, specifically at δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1− δ, but steeper elsewhere.
 Match-fixing. Without loss of generality, consider the case of bribing team 1. Upon
bribery, p1 is secretly reduced to λp1. The bettors do not suspect foul play, and their
betting rule remains unchanged. The bookie determines the optimal prices by maximizing
the following objective function subject to the constraints in (3):
EΠb = y
[
n1(pi1)(1−
λp1
pi1
) + n2(pi2)(1−
1− λp1
pi2
)
]
− (1− λp1)c(p1) − s, (6)
where c(p1) = B1 + α1sB = w+ α1(p1)(sP + sB).
Proposition 2. The optimal match-fixing prices are
pib1 =
{
max {p1 − δ,
√
λp1(p1 + δ)}, ∀p1 ∈ [0, 1− δ)
max {p1 − δ,
√
λp1}, ∀p1 ∈ [1− δ, 1],
(7)
pib2 =
{ √
1− λp1, ∀p1 ∈ [0, δ)
min {p2 + δ,
√
(1− λp1)(p2 + δ)}, ∀p1 ∈ [δ, 1].
(8)
8
The constraints on the prices may now bind over a significant range of p1, depending
on the value of λ, which means that the market shares of both tickets may not always be
positive. Below, we discuss this and other implications to establish the attractiveness of
match-fixing from the bookie’s perspective.
• When the impact of sabotage is maximum. First, a special case to take note of is
λ = 0. Here, team 1 will lose with certainty, regardless of p1, and the bookie will always
set pi1 = p1−δ, which means that all bettors will bet on team 1, although both tickets
will be on offer.8 Profit is EΠb = 1− c(p1) − s. Because c
′(p1) = α ′1(p1)[sP + sB] ≥ 0,
EΠb(λ = 0) is non-increasing in p1; specifically, it is a flat line at all p1 if α
′
1(p1) = 0.
However, more interesting cases arise when λ > 0.
• Profit per bettor. From the bookie’s perspective, the expected profit per bettor
is now greater on ticket 1 and smaller on ticket 2 (due to λ < 1) compared to the
honest bookmaking case. The expected profit per bettor from ticket 1 is (1−
√
λp1
p1+δ
)
or (1−
√
λp1) or (1−
λp1
p1−δ
), and that from ticket 2 is (1−
√
1−λp1
p2+δ
) or (1−
√
1− λp1).
• Market shares. The market share of ticket 2 is not always positive. If λ is not too
large and p1 exceeds a critical level, the bookie will set pi2 = p2+δ so no bettor will bet
on team 2. Suppose λ ≤ 1 − δ; then, by setting pi2 =
√
(1− λp1)(p2 + δ) ≥ (p2 + δ),
we see that at all p1 ≥ δ1−λ betting on team 2 would be reduced to zero. In Fig. 2, we
show such combinations of λ and p1 in regions A and B.
In contrast, the market share of ticket 1 will not only always be positive but will
increase with p1, eventually reaching the maximum (refer to region A in Fig. 2). This
is a complete reversal of the honest bookmaking case. However, if p1 is small (such as
p1 < δ) or if the impact of sabotage is small, for instance if λ > 1− δ, betting on both
teams will be active. This refers to region C in Fig. 2. The betting pattern in this
region does not drastically differ from the honest bookmaking case. A full description
of the market shares is provided in the Appendix.
In sum, a combination of the following two factors enables the bookie to reverse the
betting pattern. First, as long as 0 < λ < 1, the extent of reduction in the winning
chance of team 1 increases with p1, and as do the gains from bribery. Second, the
distribution of the punters’ beliefs tracks Nature’s draw. Thus, when team 1 is the
favourite, most bettors will be optimistic about team 1; therefore, a secret reduction in
p1 via match-fixing can make offering bets even to the least optimistic bettor profitable.
8This assumes p1 > δ. For p1 ≤ δ, optimal pi1 would be arbitrarily close to zero.
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p1
l
1
11-dd
1-d
d/(1-l0)
l0
(p1-d)/p1
(p1-d)
2/p1
(p1-d)
2        
p1(p1+d)A
BC(1-2d)2
(1-d)
0 < n1, n2 < 1
0 < n1 < 1
n2 = 0
n1=1, n2 =0
Figure 2: Betting patterns under match-fixing
All this requires is a sufficient reduction in the price of ticket 1. However, when team
1 is a longshot, most bettors will be pessimistic about team 1. Hence, it will be too
difficult to induce them to bet on team 1; in anticipation of that difficulty, bribing the
longshot will not be worthwhile.
In light of the above discussion, it is clear that our analysis will be too lengthy if we
consider the entire range of p1. To present our formal analysis in a clear manner we will
restrict our attention to p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ]. Later on, we provide some simulation results for the
whole range of p1. We also focus on λ ∈ [0, 1 − δ] wherever necessary because match-fixing
is not worthwhile at very high values of λ.
For p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ] and λ ∈ [0, 1), the expected gross profit under match-fixing is9
EΠGb (p1; λ) =

1− λp1p1−δ ∀ λ ≤
(p1−δ)
2
p1(p1+δ)
1
2δ
[
p1(1+ λ) + δ− 2
√
λp1(p1 + δ)
]
∀ (p1−δ)2
p1(p1+δ)
< λ < p1−δp1
1
δ
[
1+ δ−
√
λp1(p1 + δ) −
√
(1− λp1)(p2 + δ)
]
∀ p1−δp1 ≤ λ.
(9)
After subtracting the bribe and the possible penalties, we derive the net profit as
EΠb(p1; λ) = EΠ
G
b (p1, λ) − (1− λp1)c(p1) − s.
9The detailed profit function for all possible (p1, λ) can be derived with the help of (n1, R1) and (n2, R2),
as in the Appendix.
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Using Assumption 2 and denoting sB + sP = F, write:
EΠb(p1; λ) = EΠ
G
b (p1, λ) − (1− λp1)[w+ (α+ γp1)F] − s. (10)
There are some key properties of EΠb that we would like to highlight in several lemmas.
They concern the behaviours of EΠb with respect to p1, λ, and some of the fixed components
of the bribe costs, such as w or F, and the minimum point of the EΠb curve itself. Identifying
these properties is essential to compare profits under bribery and honest pricing.
Generally speaking, subject to some (mild) conditions, the expected profit curve implied
by (10) will shift downward if the impact of sabotage falls (i.e., λ increases) or the player’s
prize money w increases, which calls for a bigger bribe at all p1. This is established in the
following lemma.
Lemma 1. EΠb(p1; λ,w) is decreasing in w at all λ ∈ [0, 1). It is also decreasing in λ ∈
[0, 1− δ], if w+ F <
√
1−δ(1−δ)−(1−δ)
2δ(1−δ)
√
1−δ(1−δ)
(≡ c¯).
However, the behaviour of the profit curve is less clear-cut with respect to p1. There
are two sources of uncertainty. The first source is the expected cost of bribery, Ec = (1 −
λp1)[w+ (α+ γp1)F], which may increase or decrease with p1, depending on λ:
∂Ec
∂p1
= −λ[w+ (α+ 2γp1)F] + γF,
∂Ec
∂p1
≤ (>) 0 if λ ≥ (<) γF
w+ (α+ 2γp1)F
.
Low levels of λ imply a greater ex ante risk of detection and, in turn, a greater expected cost.
The second source is the way in which the slope of the profit function (i.e., ∂EΠb/∂p1)
behaves. In particular, if the profit curve has an interior minimum, we want to know where
the minimum occurs, e.g., at p1 less or greater than 1/2. This, in part, depends on whether
c ′(p1) = 0 or c ′(p1) > 0. When c ′(p1) = 0, i.e., if the probability of investigation is fixed,
the EΠb curve can have an interior minimum only in the region C, as shown in Fig. 2. This
means the bookie will do strictly better in regions B and A of Fig. 2, sharply highlighting
the attractiveness of bribing the favourite. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Suppose γ = 0 so that c(p1) = α, and EΠb(.) > 0 at all p1 ∈ [δ, 1 − δ]. Then
if EΠb has an interior minimum, betting on team 2 (the winning team) must be active. If
betting on team 2 is not active, EΠb must be increasing in p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ].
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When c ′(p1) > 0, we cannot say that the expected profit under bribery will always be
increasing in regions B and A of Fig. 2. In that sense, the attractiveness of bribing the
favourite is less prominent. A larger exogenous bribe (such as w) forces the profit function
to fall sharply and reach its minimum rather quickly (i.e., at some p1 that is well below
1/2). However, a greater λ only slows the fall in profit to arrive at the minimum of EΠb at
some p1 > 1/2. Thus, we try to strike a balance between the two opposite effects by setting
a lower bound on the expected cost and ensure at least that the interior minimum of EΠb
occurs at some p1 < 1/2. Lemma 3 does precisely that. This suffices to guarantee that
bribing the favourite will be more rewarding than bribing the longshot.
Lemma 3. Suppose EΠb(p1; λ) > 0, and it has an interior minimum at p
∗
1. Then p
∗
1 is
inversely related to w. Further, if γF < δ/(1 − δ)3, and w is above a critical level w =
max{w1, w2} (where w1, w2 are given by Eqs. (17) and (21), respectively), p
∗
1 is strictly less
than 1/2 at all 0 < λ < 1.
The restrictions on the costs are motivated as follows. First, when the impact of sabotage
is very strong (very low λ), the entire market is captured by ticket 1; in this case, the only
cost the bookie needs to worry about is the (increasing) risk of investigation. As long as the
marginal fine cost γF is not too large, the profit function will still be rising. Second, when
the market is not fully captured by ticket 1, profit may initially fall and then rise, depending
on p1 and λ. If w, a key component of the bribe, is above some threshold, the profit will fall
quite rapidly before turning around to rise. The threshold level of w varies depending on
whether both bets are active or only one bet is active (with incomplete market coverage).
These two thresholds are denoted as w1 and w2.
The key point of Lemma 3 is that compared to the honest pricing case, the shape of
the expected profit curve under bribery will become twisted in a certain way, as shown in
the two panels of Fig. 3. If the bribery cost is fairly large and the impact of sabotage is
moderate, the match-fixing profit quickly drops to zero or even becomes negative; it then
becomes positive again only after p1 exceeds some level. This is shown in panel a of Fig. 3,
thus supporting a common perception that longshots are unattractive for fixing.
The second possibility, as shown in panel b of Fig. 3, is that the bribery cost may be
moderate (but not below the threshold level), so that the bribery profit remains positive
throughout, a scenario discussed in Lemma 3. In both panels, the minimum of the match-
fixing profit curves never occurs at p1 > 1/2. This is a result of persistent steering of betting
toward team 1 in the complete reversal of the betting pattern under honest bookmaking.
 Match-fixing or honest bookmaking? We now compare bookie’s profit from match-
fixing with that from honest bookmaking. First, note two extreme cases: λ = 0 and λ→ 1.
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Figure 3: Regions of bribery
As already noted, when λ = 0, the bookie earns EΠb = 1 − c(p1) − s. If c
′(p1) = 0, his
profit is given by a flat line as shown in panel a of Fig. 3, and if c ′(p1) > 0 then it will be
a declining line as in panel b of Fig. 3. Compare this bribery profit curve in both panels of
Fig. 3 with the profit curve from honest bookmaking, EΠ0. We may find all contests in the
[δ, 1− δ] range preferred for fixing. At the same time, it is noteworthy that some extremely
uneven contests, such as contests close to p1 = 0 and p1 = 1, will never be fixed.
At the other extreme, when λ→ 1, the profit from match-fixing must be strictly less than
the profit from honest bookmaking, due to the positive match-fixing cost. Let us assume
that at all λ ∈ [1 − δ, 1), EΠb < EΠ0. By Lemma 1 the EΠb curve will shift upwards if we
successively reduce λ below 1−δ. At some point we will have tangency between the EΠb and
EΠ0 curves. The specific λ at which the tangency occurs is denoted λ^, as shown in Fig. 3.
It is obvious now that the region of bribery [a1(λ), b1(λ)] is largest at λ = 0 and smallest
(i.e., a single point with a1 = b1) at λ^. That is to say, the region of bribery consistently
shrinks with the lessening of sabotage. Let us call a(λ^) the limiting contest that is optimal
over the maximal range of λ. This limiting contest must be greater than 1/2, because the
minimum of EΠb occurs at p1 < 1/2, compared to the minimum of EΠ0, which occurs at
p1 = 1/2. That a(λ^) > 1/2 indicates the sustainability of a favourite for bribing.
There is another point to note. If c ′(p1) = 0, i.e., the probability of investigation is
fixed, the set of contests optimal for fixing will have a favourite bias. That is, we will have
a1 > 1−b1, and more than half of the fixed contests will feature team 1 as the favourite. In
contrast, if the investigation risk is increasing in p1, then the bias in the set of fixed contests
will depend on the value of λ. At low values of λ the majority of these contests will feature
team 1 as the underdog (i.e., a1 < 1 − b1) and after a critical value of λ team 1 will be
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the favourite in most of the fixed contests. This occurs because the marginal effect of the
investigation risk is overturned only after λ exceeds a critical value.
Proposition 3 (Match-fixing). Suppose that some contests are optimal to fix at λ = 0
and no contest is optimal to fix at λ = 1 − δ. Then, given Assumptions 1–3 and conditions
in Lemma 1-3, there exists a critical λ, say λ^ < 1 − δ, such that match-fixing occurs over a
range of contests p1 ∈ [a1, b1] at all λ < λ^. With an increase in λ the match-fixing set of
contests will shrink (i.e., a ′1(λ) > 0, b
′
1(λ) < 0), eventually at λ^ collapsing to the limiting
contest a(λ^) which must be greater than 1/2.
Furthermore, if c ′(p1) = 0, the match-fixing set will have a favorite bias (a1 > 1 − b1).
However, if c ′(p1) > 0 then the match-fixing set will exhibit longshot (favourite) bias at λ
below (above) a critical value.
 Which team to bribe? Now we ask: when both teams are accessible for fixing, which
team is the bookie going to pick? Based on the argument made for bribing team 1, and
symmetrically defining the bribery region of team 2 as [a2(λ), b2(λ)], we can see that a2 =
1−b1 and a1 = 1−b2. Drawing two bribery profit curves on the same graph and comparing
them with the profit curve under honest bookmaking we can see that there are two possible
configurations – either a2 ≤ a1 < 1/2 < b2 ≤ b1, or a2 < b2 ≤ 1/2 ≤ a1 < b1.
In the first case, bribing team 2 is more profitable over the interval [a2,
1
2
), and bribing
team 1 is more profitable over the interval [ 1
2
, b1] . In the second case, the preferred intervals
for bribery change to (a2, b2) for team 2 and (a1, b1) for team 1.
Proposition 4 (Bribe the favourite). Suppose either team is corruptible, and the bookie
can select the team to bribe at will. Then, there exists a range of λ and a range of contests
such that bribery is preferred to honest bookmaking and the bribed team will be the favourite.
 Illustrative simulation. We illustrate the key points of bribery with some numerical
examples in Table 1, assuming that only team 1 is bribed. In the numerical examples we
cover the entire range of p1 and λ.
We present four sets of simulations based on three specifications of α1(p1). In the first
section of the table, we present the case of α1 = α, which is the fixed probability of investi-
gation case. The next two sections present the case of α1 = p
2
1/2 for two different values of
w. The last section of the table considers α1 = p1, the linear investigation probability case
assumed in our theoretical model.
Throughout, bettors’ collective wealth is 1 and δ = 0.2. In the top section we assume
w + α1F = 0.2. The maximum λ up to which bribery is optimal is λ^ = 0.626. The
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Table 1: Bribe inducement range of p1
α1 = α δ = 0.20 w+ αF = 0.20 λ^ = 0.626 p^1 = 0.795
λ 0 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.6 0.626
a1 0.002 0.009 0.044 0.33 0.60 0.795
b1 0.998 0.989 0.965 0.935 0.81 0.795
α1(p1) = p
2
1/2 δ = 0.2 w = 0.2 F = 0.2 λ^ = 0.581 p^1 = 0.77
λ 0 0.20 0.40 0.50 0.581
a1 0.003 0.01 0.039 0.37 0.77
b1 0.994 0.982 0.951 0.91 0.77
α1(p1) = p
2
1/2 δ = 0.2 w = 0.25 F = 0.2 λ^ = 0.542 p^1 = 0.76
λ 0 0.20 0.40 0.45 0.50 0.542
a1 0.004 0.017 0.293 0.395 0.534 0.76
b1 0.992 0.978 0.943 0.92 0.89 0.76
α1(p1) = p1 δ = 0.2 w = 0.20 F = 0.15 λ^ = 0.538 p^1 = 0.795
λ 0 0.20 0.40 0.415 0.50 0.538
a1 0.002 0.01 0.045 0.065 0.537 0.795
b1 0.993 0.978 0.942 0.935 0.882 0.795
bribery region starts with [0.006, 0.994] at λ = 0 and eventually contracts to a singular point
p1 = 0.795. Note that the match-fixing set [a1, b1] is biased toward the favourite at all λ > 0,
as we claim in Proposition 3.
Next, in the convex and increasing probability of investigation case of α1(p1) = p
2
1/2, we
first assume w = 0.20 and F = 0.20. In this case, as we argue in Proposition 3 (although for
a slightly different α1(.) function) that the match-fixing set will be initially (at low values
of λ) biased towards the underdog and then flip towards the favourite, the numbers bear
out the pattern. At some λ between 0.40 and 0.50, the flip occurs, with the match-fixing
set being predominantly concentrated on the favourite after the flip. The limiting contest
is 0.77, which occurs at λ = 0.581. A second example of the same specification of α1(.) is
provided with w = 0.25. With a higher bribe cost, the flip of the match-fixing set occurs
between 0.20 and 0.30, and the limiting contest falls to 0.76 at a slightly smaller λ. Both
examples show, as expected, that with the increasing risk of investigation λ^ becomes smaller
compared to the case of the fixed probability of investigation.
Finally, for the linear investigation probability α1 = p1, we set w = 0.20 and F = 0.15
and find that the limiting contest increases again to 0.795, largely because the expected cost
rises at a constant rate, instead of an increasing rate. However, the pattern is similar. Here
too, the match-fixing set [a1, b1] is initially biased towards the underdog, and then after
λ = 0.415 it is heavily tilted towards the favourite.
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4 Rational Bettors
Our model has, so far, relied on two key assumptions: the bettors are not rational, and the
bookie holds superior information. In this section, we show that even if bettors are rational,
our central result on bribery of the favourite may still hold, as long as the bookie does
not have informational superiority. We suggest a variant model with binary (uncorrupted)
winning odds and binary signals with the following assumptions: (i) bettors are rational in
the sense that they will update their beliefs about the teams’ winning chances in cognisance
of match-fixing, (ii) the bookie observes a noisy signal about Nature’s draw just like any
other bettor, and (iii) the bookie is not guaranteed to have an access to a team for bribery.
Assumption (ii) is critical to create a scope for gainful trade between the bookie and the
bettors, and it allows them to have divergent beliefs within the same information hierarchy.
Otherwise we will run into the well-known ‘no-trade’ result of Milgrom and Stokey (1982).
Below, we outline the model, report a result and discuss its intuition. The formal analysis,
given its detailed nature, is contained in a separate supplementary file.
 Flat (prior) information hierarchy model. As above, consider a two-team contest
with a win-or-loss outcome. Let p1, the probability of team 1’s win, be drawn from {p`, ph}
such that 0 < p` < 1/2 < ph < 1. Assume that ℘ = Pr(p1 = p`) < 1/2, so the prior favours
team 1.
There is a continuum of rational bettors of mass and collective wealth 1, and they draw
conditionally independent signals σ ∈ {σ`, σh} according to the following distribution:
β = Pr(σ = σ`|p1 = p`) = Pr(σ = σh|p1 = ph), 1−β = Pr(σ = σh|p1 = p`) = Pr(σ = σ`|p1 = ph),
where 1/2 < β < 1. For match-fixing, consider for simplicity λ = 0 such that fixing ensures
losing. Also assume γ = 0 such that the probability of investigation is fixed. Furthermore,
c = w+ α · (sp + sB) and s = α0s ′B are “small” to ensure a scope for match-fixing.
The bookie also observes, independently, a noisy binary signal σb ∈ {σ`, σh} of Nature’s
draw according to the same conditional distribution (β, 1− β). Given that the bookie is no
better in predicting the teams’ winning chances, the two parties – the bookie and the bettors
– can possibly hope to trade profitably. Specifically, with the bookie’s signal being noisy,
bettors might not be able to tell from a ‘cheap bet’ whether the bookie has fixed the match
or just received a signal indicating a low chance of the corresponding team’s win.
The bookie can access either only team 1 or only team 2 each with an identical probability
θ, 0 < θ < 1/2, and fails to have access to either team with probability 1 − 2θ. This last
possibility will add further uncertainty about match-fixing.
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The game proceeds as follows:
p1 drawn (σb, σ) drawn bribery prices posted match outcome investigate
• • • • • • •
access teams or no bribery bettors bets placed bets settled penalties
with 2θ prob. update
Figure 4: Time line
We do not intend to present a full-blown analysis of this model. Our sole aim is to
construct an equilibrium that admits match-fixing.
 Strategies. To be able to give a sense of the model’s workings leading to a match-fixing
equilibrium, we now describe the qualitative nature of the bookie’s strategy. The strategy
is the decision of bribery/no bribery of a team conditional on access, and a pair of prices.
Our primary interest will be in a partial pooling (perfect Bayesian) equilibrium. With this
in mind, we partition the bookie’s information set into two sets of nodes as follows:
I1 ≡

I1 = {access team 1, σb = σh}
I2 = {access team 1, σb = σ`}
I3 = {no access, σb = σ`}
(11)
I2 ≡

I4 = {access team 2, σb = σ`}
I5 = {access team 2, σb = σh}
I6 = {no access, σb = σh} .
(12)
Our equilibrium will involve two distinct price pairs – one each for I1 and I2 – seeing
which the bettors can identify the information set at play but not the individual nodes. The
bettors’ strategy is a mapping from price pairs and privately observed signal to beliefs (a
probability distribution over individual nodes) and a corresponding optimal betting.
In the supplementary material, we derive conditions (including the bettors’ equilibrium
and out-of-equilibrium beliefs) for the following equilibrium:
Proposition 5 (Rational betting under suspicion of match-fixing). Under suitable
parameters (p`, ph, ℘, β, θ, c, s), the following will be true:
(i) There exist two distinct price pairs, (pi∗1, pi
∗
2) for information set I1 and (pi∗∗1 , pi∗∗2 ) for
information set I2, such that at I1, the bookie bribes only team 1 (on access), the
favourite team according to his private signal, and at I2, he bribes only team 2 (on
access), his perceived favourite team.
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(ii) Bettors will place bets as follows:
1) If the announced prices are (pi∗1, pi
∗
2), then those who have observed σ = σh will bet
on team 1 and those who have observed σ = σ` will bet on team 2.
2) If the announced prices are (pi∗∗1 , pi
∗∗
2 ), then those who have observed σ = σ` will bet
on team 2, and those who have observed σ = σh will bet on team 1.
Remarks. (i) In the proposed equilibrium, the bookie creates a doubt about whether he
has bribed but leaves no doubt as to which team he might have bribed, if he bribed at all. In
addition, whenever he bribes a team, it is also the team that he reckons to be the favourite.
(ii) Bettors also bet on their perceived favourites, hoping that the bookie has received an
opposite signal. (iii) One group of bettors will hope that the match has not been fixed,
whereas the other group would wish the opposite. For instance, at I1 the bettors with signal
σh hope that the match has not been fixed, and the bookie has observed σ`. However, the
bettors with signal σ` would hope that the bookie has observed σh and fixed the match. (iv)
Finally, the constructed equilibrium is not necessarily the best equilibrium from the bookie’s
point of view, because we do not address the equilibrium selection issue.
Examples. We are able to report the following two sets of parameter values confirming
Proposition 5. A supplementary file provides the corresponding numerical values of the
bookie and bettor payoffs, based on the derived analytical equilibrium conditions.10
Table 2: Parameters
λ = 0 ph = 0.653286 p` = 0.363761 ℘ = 0.336077
β = 0.625798 θ = 0.160131 c = 0.147717 s = 0.014554
pi∗1 = 0.506417 pi
∗
2 = 0.569213 pi
∗∗
1 = 0.655001 pi
∗∗
2 = 0.373474
Table 3: Parameters
λ = 0 ph = 0.745445 p` = 0.329499 ℘ = 0.094006
β = 0.730153 θ = 0.145988 c = 0.118418 s = 0.008619
pi∗1 = 0.6477 pi
∗
2 = 0.494873 pi
∗∗
1 = 0.745207 pi
∗∗
2 = 0.257546
5 Further Discussions
We discuss how our correlated beliefs model will change if we relax or modify some of the
assumptions that underpinned the analysis of Section 2.
10Simulation has been done using R programming.
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1. A general distribution function of bettors’ beliefs. Suppose that q, the bettors’
belief about team 1’s winning chance, is distributed over [p1 − δ, p1 + δ] according to
a probability distribution function G(q) with density g(q). Assume that G(q) has a
single peak and that g(q) > 0. Bag and Saha (2016) modelled this case in a slightly
different context, where an honest bookie addresses an anonymous fixer-cum-bettor.
Based on Bag and Saha (2016), we can say that if certain conditions are met by
G(q), our qualitative results are likely to be maintained.11 Intuitively, majority of the
bettors’ beliefs will be concentrated around p1, so the profit will be far less from honest
bookmaking, making match-fixing an attractive option.
However, we may obtain different results if the distribution function is bi-modal
and the two modes appear on either side of p1. In this case, one group of bettors
is optimistic about team 1 and the other group is pessimistic. Then, inducing the
pessimists to bet on team 1 is not easy unless the reduction in p1 via bribery is really
substantial. Thus, match-fixing is less likely to be optimal.
2. Possibility of draw. Suppose Nature picks (p1, p2) probabilities of team 1 and team 2
winning respectively, with p3 = 1−(p1+p2) being the probability of a draw (or tie). The
bettors draw a pair of private signals (q1, q2) from the set [p1−δ, p1+δ]×[p2−δ, p2+δ]
according to some distribution. Their belief of a tie is 1−q1−q2. They will, however,
bet on only one outcome.
Suppose team 1 is bribed to lower its probability of winning to λp1. But team 2’s
win probability will not automatically rise by (1− λ)p1. Rather, part of (1− λ)p1 will
be transferred to the probability of a tie as well. This is likely to be so, even if λ = 0.
The bookie must consider (for bribing) how the probabilities of the two other events
are altered, relative to the distribution of bettors’ beliefs. We believe the intuition for
bribing the favourite remains true because the average bettor’s belief will coincide with
Nature’s draw, and therefore, turning the most likely event less likely will continue to
be profitable.
In addition, match-fixing may invite less attention from the enforcement authority,
which is more likely to react if the favourite loses than when there is a tie.12 Further-
more, if λ can be freely chosen, then a moderate value of λ may possibly make a tie
11We need that G(q) is single-peaked, exhibits decreasing hazard rate, and in addition, G(q)/g(q) should
be increasing in q. These conditions will ensure some regularity properties of the optimal prices.
12Of course in tournaments where the outcome of an individual contest between two teams determines all
teams’ relative standings possibly affecting promotion and relegation of teams, even a tie could signify foul
play and intense investigation.
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more likely than a loss. In that sense, the integrity of sports will be compromised more
often, though possibly with less severity.
3. Scoreline/margin betting. Betting on the margin (of victory) can be modelled by
extending our win-loss framework as follows. Suppose that it is common knowledge
that team 1 is the favourite, i.e., p1 > p2, but that the bettors might differ in their
perception of how strong team 1 is. This can be represented by letting p1 ∈ (1/2, 1) be
drawn according to some distribution. Then, the margin of victory can be thought of
as some increasing function m = f(p1
p2
) (e.g., m = ln(p1
p2
)). The bookie and the players
observe p1 precisely while bettors independently draw a signal q that is positively
correlated with p1 with E[q|p1] = p1.
Now, given any draw of p1, the bookie will be able to estimate the true (non-corrupt)
expected margin of victory which will also agree with the average bettor’s estimate. In
such a situation, without corruption the bookie will not be able to make much profit
because bets on two sides of the expected margin will mostly cancel out. Therefore,
through bribery the bookie might be able to distance the margin of victory from the
market’s expectation, thus opening up profit opportunities.
Betting on the margin is very profitable where betting on the winning or losing is
not permitted as in many American sports, as well as where one team is particularly
strong. The bookie can then divide the bettors between the high-belief and the low-
belief categories by offering betting odds on margins. When only margin betting is
considered our model is more appropriate in the sense that λ > 0 implies a range
of ‘point shaving’, which has been empirically investigated in Wolfers (2006) for the
United States.
4. Bribe paid beforehand. Suppose, different from our model, the bribe is given
unconditionally before the outcome. Assuming that the bribe-taker will not renege
due to reputation cost, taking the bribe (and honouring it by underperforming) is
optimal for the player if
B1 + (1− λp1)α1(p1)sP + λp1w ≥ p1w or, B1 ≥ p1(1− λ)w+ (1− λp1)α1(p1)sP.
If B1 = p1(1 − λ)w + (1 − λp1)α1(p1)sP, then we see that the bribe amount here is
much smaller than that in Section 2. This alone suggests that match-fixing will be
more profitable. The expected cost of the bookie, bribe plus his own fine, will be
Ec = p1(1− λ)w+(1− λp1)α1(p1)F, and it will have similar relationships with p1 and
λ. Therefore the qualitative results will not be different.
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5. Bribe sensitive to prices. In our model, the bribe enters the bookie’s expected
profit as a fixed cost, sensitive to p1 but not to (pi1, pi2). Suppose the bribe includes
the minimum amount necessary for underperformance, plus a share (τ) of the bookie’s
ex post profit. Assuming that team 1 is bribed and paid ex post only in the event of
the team’s loss, the bribe will be given by
B1 = w+ α1(p1)sP + τn1(pi1).
The expected profit of the bookie from bribery is then
EΠb = n1(pi1)
(
1−
λp1
pi1
)
+n2(pi2)
(
1−
1− λp1
pi2
)
−(1−λp1)[w+α1(p1)F+τn1(pi1)]−s.
Optimal pi1 would be given by(
1−
λp1
pi1
)
n ′1(pi1) + n1(pi1)
λp1
pi21
= (1− λp1)τn
′
1(pi1).
Because the right-hand side is negative (as n ′1(pi1) < 0), optimal pi1 will be smaller
(or no greater) than what is found under the fixed bribe. Optimal pi2 will not change.
This means the market share of bets on team 1 will be even greater, which will only
reinforce the qualitative results of our fixed-bribe model.
6. Legal betting environment. What if the bookie is corrupt, but betting is legal?
In this environment, one interesting possibility is that the enforcement authority can
condition its decision to investigate on both p1 and posted prices. The bookie’s decision
to engage in corruption and the enforcement authority’s decision to investigate should
then be modelled as strategic interactions.
Strategic interactions between these two agents can also be permitted in our current
model by letting αi(p1) to be endogenous by modelling the enforcement authority’s
objectives and constraints. In anticipation of the endogenous enforcement, the bookie
may randomize over his decision to fix the match or stay honest. Match-fixing may
then emerge as a mixed strategy equilibrium.
7. Policy implications. One policy question concerns legalization of betting. Although
the tax collected on betting could be a strong and obvious motive for legalization,
our study suggests that there are some more benefits to follow. The bookmakers will
have a long-term interest in the industry and will thus have less incentive to engage
in corruption. They can also be regulated. In addition, because prices will be public,
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enforcement can be ‘smart’ in the sense described above. However, the authority also
needs data on teams’ initial chances, the size of the betting market and the spread
of the market (online or spatial), as laid out in our model. Thus, close coordination
is needed between police, sports regulation bodies and betting companies, often over
multiple jurisdictions. The coordination issue has been discussed at length in Haberfeld
and Sheehan (2013), both in general terms as well as with some specific experience of
Brazilian soccer. Our theoretical exercise suggests a similar strategy.
Appendix: Omitted proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Substitute n1(pi1) and n2(pi2) from (1) into the objective function
(2) for any given interval of p1 and then derive the unconstrained solutions as in (4).
Now, verify that they are valid within the relevant interval of p1 ensuring positive bets
on both teams. Consider first p1 ∈ [δ, 1 − δ]. That pi01 =
√
p1(p1 + δ) < p1 + δ and√
p1(p1 + δ) > p1 − δ when p1 > δ/3 are clear, because δ/3 < δ. Similarly, 1− pi
0
2 > p1 − δ
implies pi02 < p2 + δ. That
√
p2(p2 + δ) < p2 + δ is obvious, and 1 − pi
0
2 < p1 + δ (or
pi02 > p2−δ) implies
√
p2(p2 + δ) > p2−δ which is valid for all δ, p1 > 0. Elsewhere, clearly√
p1 < 1 and
√
p2 > 0. Therefore, 0 < n1 < 1 and 0 < n2 < 1 at all p1 ∈ (0, 1).
In this context we also note the following to be true at (pi01, pi
0
2) :
for 0 ≤ p1 < δ, n1 = 1−
√
p1
p1+δ
and n2 =
1−
√
p2
p1+δ
for δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1− δ, n1 = p1+δ2δ
(
1−
√
p1
p1+δ
)
and n2 =
p2+δ
2δ
(
1−
√
p2
p2+δ
)
for 1− δ < p1 ≤ 1, n1 = 1−
√
p1
p2+δ
and n2 = 1−
√
p2
p2+δ
.
(13)
Differentiating n1 and n2 with respect to p1, we obtain
for 0 ≤ p1 < δ, n ′1(p1) = − δ2pi1(p1+δ) < 0 and n ′2(p1) =
(1−
√
p2)
2+δ
2(p1+δ)2
√
p2
> 0
for δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1− δ, n ′1(p1) = 2pi1−(2p1+δ)4δpi1 < 0 and n ′2(p1) =
2pi2−(2p2+δ)
4δpi2
× p ′2(p1) > 0
for 1− δ < p1 ≤ 1, n ′1(p1) = − (1−
√
p1)
2+δ
2(p2+δ)2
√
p1
< 0 and n ′2(p1) =
δ
2pi2(p2+δ)
> 0.
(14)
In the range δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1 − δ, n ′1(p1) < 0 because 2p1 + δ > 2pi1 = 2
√
p1(p1 + δ). This
can be verified by checking that (2p1 + δ)
2 > 4p1(p1 + δ). Then, by symmetry n
′
2(p1) > 0.
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Next, substituting (pi01, pi
0
2) in EΠ0, we derive Eq. (5). Differentiating EΠ0 w.r.t. p1, we
obtain
EΠ ′0(p1) =

[
pi1{(1+δ)+pi2(pi1+pi2)}−pi2{(p1+δ)
2+2pi1}
(p1+δ)2pi1pi2
]
< 0 for p1 < δ
1
2δ
[
− 2p1+δ
pi1
+ 2p2+δ
pi2
]
≥ (<)0 if p1 ≥ (<)p2 for δ ≤ p1 ≤ 1− δ[
pi2{(1+δ)+pi1(pi1+pi2)}−pi1{(p2+δ)
2+2pi2}
(p2+δ)2pi1pi2
]
> 0 for 1− δ < p1.
(15)
That EΠ ′0(p1) < 0 at all 0 ≤ p1 < δ and EΠ ′0(p1) > 0 at all 1 − δ < p1 ≤ 1 is
ensured by Assumption 3. To ascertain the sign of EΠ ′0(p1) at p1 ∈ [δ, 1 − δ] we show
that 2p1+δ
pi1
> (<) 2p2+δ
pi2
if p1 < (>)p2. Consider the inequality
2p1+δ
pi1
> 2p2+δ
pi2
, and write
pi1 =
√
p1(p1 + δ) and pi2 =
√
p2(p2 + δ) to obtain
√
p1
p1 + δ
+
√
p1 + δ
p1
>
√
p2
p2 + δ
+
√
p2 + δ
p2
or,
(√
p1
p1 + δ
+
√
p1 + δ
p1
)2
>
(√
p2
p2 + δ
+
√
p2 + δ
p2
)2
or,
p1
p1 + δ
+
p1 + δ
p1
>
p2
p2 + δ
+
p2 + δ
p2
or,
p1 + δ
p1
−
p2 + δ
p2
>
p2
p2 + δ
−
p1
p1 + δ
or,
(p2 − p1)δ
p1p2
>
(p2 − p1)δ
(p1 + δ)(p2 + δ)
or,
p2 + δ
p2
>
p1
p1 + δ
(because p2 > p1).
It can also be verified that EΠ ′′0 (p1) > 0 at all p1. For the sake of economy, we do not
report the detailed expression of EΠ ′′0 (p1). That EΠ0(p1) is a convex curve proves that EΠ0
is at a minimum at p1 = 1/2. Q.E.D.
 Market shares and per-bettor profit under match-fixing. Using the
market share rule given in Eq. (1) and optimal prices given in Eqs. (7)–(8), in what follows,
we derive the market shares and per-bettor profits.
Market shares.
• If λ = 0, n1 = 1 and n2 = 0 for all p1 ∈ [0, 1].
• If λ > 0 and p1 < δ then the market shares (for any λ > 0) are:
n1 =
(
1−
√
λp1
p1 + δ
)
and n2 =
1−
√
1− λp1
p1 + δ
.
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• If p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ], then the following function describes the market share of ticket 1:
n1 =

(
1−
√
λp1
p1+δ
)
· p1+δ
2δ
for λ ≥ (p1−δ)2
p1(p1+δ)
1 for λ < (p1−δ)
2
p1(p1+δ)
.
• If p1 ∈ (1− δ, 1], then the market share of ticket 1 is
n1 =
{
1−
√
λp1
p2+δ
for λ ≥ (p1−δ)2
p1
1 for λ < (p1−δ)
2
p1
.
• For the market share of ticket 2, the following rule applies when p1 > δ and λ > 0:
n2 =

(
1−
√
1−λp1
p2+δ
)
· p2+δ
2δ
for λ ≥ (p1−δ)
p1
and p1 ≤ 1− δ(
1−
√
1−λp1
p2+δ
)
for λ ≥ (p1−δ)
p1
and p1 > 1− δ
0 for λ < (p1−δ)
p1
.
Per-bettor profit. Let us denote per-bettor profit for ticket 1 as R1 and the same for
ticket 2 as R2.
• If λ = 0, R1 = 1 and R2 = 0 for all p1 ∈ [0, 1].
• If λ > 0 and p1 < δ, then the per-bettor profit from ticket 1 and ticket 2, respectively,
(for any λ > 0) are:
R1 =
(
1−
√
λp1
p1 + δ
)
and R2 = 1−
√
1− λp1.
• If p1 ∈ [δ, 1], then the following is the per-bettor profit from ticket 1:
R1 =

1−
√
λp1
p1+δ
for λ ≥ (p1−δ)2
p1(p1+δ)
and p1 ≤ 1− δ
1−
√
λp1 for λ ≥ (p1−δ)2p1 and p1 > 1− δ
1− λp1
p1−δ
for λ < (p1−δ)
2
p1(p1+δ)
.
• If p1 ∈ [δ, 1], the per-bettor profit from ticket 2 is given as follows:
R2 =
 1−
√
1−λp1
p2+δ
for λ > (p1−δ)
p1
0 for λ ≤ (p1−δ)
p1
.
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Proof of Lemma 1. It is obvious that EΠb is decreasing in w. For the effect of λ, there are
three cases to consider.
Case 1. λ ≤ (p1−δ)2
p1(p1+δ)
.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), we see that
∂EΠb
∂λ
=
[
−
1
p1 − δ
+ c(p1)
]
p1 < 0, because
1
p1 − δ
> 1 > c(p1).
Case 2. (p1−δ)
2
p1(p1+δ)
< λ < p1−δ
p1
.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), we derive
∂EΠb
∂λ
=
p1
2δ
[
1+ 2δc(p1) −
√
p1 + δ√
λp1
]
.
We want ∂EΠb
∂λ
< 0 at all p1 ∈ [δ, 1−δ] and all λ ∈ ( (p1−δ)2p1(p1+δ) ,
p1−δ
p1
). Because
√
p1+δ√
λp1
is decreasing
in both λ and p1 and c(p1) is increasing in p1, we want to ensure that
√
p1+δ√
λp1
> 1+ 2δc(p1)
holds at λ = p1−δ
p1
and p1 = 1−δ. Substituting these two largest values of λ and p1, we write
∂EΠb
∂λ
=
1− δ
2δ
[
1+ 2δc(1− δ) −
1√
1− 2δ
]
< 0 if and only if c(1−δ) <
1−
√
1− 2δ
2δ
√
1− 2δ
.
Because c(1−δ) = w+[α+γ(1−δ)]F < w+F, our sufficient conditionw+F <
√
1−δ(1−δ)−(1−δ)
2δ(1−δ)
√
1−δ(1−δ)
ensures that c(1− δ) < 1−
√
1−2δ
2δ
√
1−2δ
because 1−
√
1−2δ
2δ
√
1−2δ
>
√
1−δ(1−δ)−(1−δ)
2δ(1−δ)
√
1−δ(1−δ)
.
Case 3. p1−δ
p1
< λ < 1− δ.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), we now obtain
∂EΠb
∂λ
=
p1
2δ
[
−
√
p1 + δ√
λp1
+
√
p2 + δ√
1− λp1
+ 2δc(p1)
]
< 0,
if and only if √
p1 + δ√
λp1
>
√
p2 + δ√
1− λp1
+ 2δc(p1).
Note that vis-a`-vis p1 the LHS of the above inequality is smallest at the largest value of
p1, i.e., p1 = 1−δ. On the RHS, the first term is largest at p1 = δ (because
p2+δ
1−λp1
is inversely
related to p1), and the second term is largest at p1 = 1 − δ. However, vis-a`-vis λ, the LHS
is smallest at the highest value of λ, i.e., λ = 1− δ, and the RHS is largest also at λ = 1− δ.
Therefore, by substituting the appropriate values of p1 and λ on both sides, we set the LHS
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as smallest and the RHS as largest and arrive at the following inequality:
1
1− δ
>
1√
1− δ(1− δ)
+ 2δc(1− δ).
This requires c(1 − δ) <
√
1−δ(1−δ)−(1−δ)
2δ(1−δ)
√
1−δ(1−δ)
, which would be easily met by our condition on
w+ F, because c(1− δ) < w+ F. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose γ = 0 and α > 0; thus, we denote c(p1) simply as c. Further-
more, assume EΠb(.) > 0.
Case 1 (Region C). Consider the scenario where betting is active on both sides. This
refers to the interval λ ∈ (p1−δ
p1
, 1), where 0 < n1 < 1 and 0 < n2 < 1. To minimise EΠb, set:
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
1
2δ
[
−
λ(2p1 + δ)
pi1
+
λ(2p2 + δ) + (1− λ)
pi2
]
+ λc = 0, (16)
where pi1 =
√
λp1(p1 + δ) and pi2 =
√
(1− λp1)(p2 + δ).
Suppose that p∗1 solves Eq. (16). To check the second-order condition, rewrite λ(2p2 +
δ) + (1− λ) = λ(p2 + δ) + (1− λp1) in the expression for
∂EΠb
∂p1
above, and then derive
∂2EΠb
∂p21
=
1
2δ
[
−
λ
pi21
{
2pi1 −
λ(2p1 + δ)
2
2pi1
}
+
1
pi22
{
−2pi2λ+
(λ(p2 + δ) + (1− λp1))
2
2pi2
}]
=
1
4δ
[
λ2δ2
pi31
+
((1− λp1) − λ(p2 + δ))
2
pi32
]
=
1
4δ
[
λ2δ2
pi31
+
(1− λ(1+ δ))2
pi32
]
> 0.
Therefore, p∗1 must give a minimum, and it is unique because multiple minima cannot occur
without altering the sign of the second-order derivative.
Case 2 (Region B). Consider (p1−δ)
2
p1(p1+δ)
< λ < p1−δ
p1
, where n2 = 0 and n1 < 1. Here,
EΠb must be increasing in p1. To establish this, we first show that EΠb is a strictly convex
function at all p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ] for any λ in the specified interval.
From Eqs. (9) and (10), we derive
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
1
2δ
[
1+ λ−
λ(2p1 + δ)
pi1
]
+ λc,
where pi1 =
√
λp1(p1 + δ). Differentiating further, we obtain
∂2EΠb
∂p21
= −
λ
2δpi21
[
2pi1 −
λ(2p1 + δ)
2
2pi1
]
= −
λ
4δpi31
[
4pi21 − λ(2p1 + δ)
2
]
=
λ2δ
4pi31
> 0.
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Thus, the slope of EΠb must be rising with p1. If we consider the lowest value of p1 in this
range and ascertain the slope of EΠb to be positive, then we know that at all higher values of
p1 the slope must also remain positive. The lowest value of p1 to consider is p1 = δ/(1− λ)
(which follows from the upper bound on λ).
Now evaluate ∂EΠb
∂p1
at p1 = δ/(1− λ) as follows:
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
1
2δ
√
2− λ
[√
(2− λ)(1+ λ) −
√
λ(3− λ)
]
+ λc.
For the term inside the bracket, it can be easily verified that the inequality
√
(2− λ)(1+λ) >√
λ(3− λ) reduces to (1− λ)2 > λ(1− λ)2 as λ < 1. Hence, EΠb is increasing.
Case 3 (Region A). Consider λ ≤ (p1−δ)2
p1(p1+δ)
. In this range n2 = 0 and n1 = 1. From
Eqs. (9) and (10), we see that
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
λδ
(p1 − δ)2
+ λc > 0 (for λ > 0) . Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. Suppose that EΠb(p1, λ) has an interior minimum between δ and 1− δ.
Denote it as p∗1, which can be obtained by solving
∂EΠb(.)
∂p1
=
∂EΠGb (.)
∂p1
−
∂Ec(.)
∂p1
= 0,
with ∂
2EΠb(.)
∂p21
> 0 holding at p∗1. Because
∂2EΠb(.)
∂p21
=
∂2EΠGb (.)
∂p21
−
∂2Ec(.)
∂p21
=
∂2EΠGb (.)
∂p21
+ 2λγF,
the second-order condition for the minimum boils down to satisfying
∂2EΠGb (.)
∂p21
> 0. Assuming
that is the case, it is easy to see that p∗1 must decline in w:
∂p∗1
∂w
= −
∂2EΠb/∂p1∂w
∂2EΠb/∂p
2
1
= −
λ
∂2EΠb/∂p
2
1
< 0.
We wish to exploit this property and set a lower bound on w such that p∗1 is always less
than 1/2. However, p∗1 is also sensitive to λ and we cannot ascertain the sign of ∂p
∗
1/∂λ; as
we see,
∂p∗1
∂λ
= −
∂2EΠb/∂p1∂λ
∂2EΠb/∂p
2
1
> (≤) 0 if ∂
2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
< (≥) 0,
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and in general the sign of ∂
2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
is ambiguous.
Now, we need to consider three ranges of λ separately to analyse the issue further.
Case 1 (Region A). In this range of λ, if p∗1 exists, it will be given by
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
λδ
(p1 − δ)2
+ λ[w+ (α+ 2γp1)F] − γF = 0.
We can check that the second-order condition for a minimum is satisfied only if δ/(1−2δ)3 <
γF, which violates our assumption. Hence, we rule out an interior minimum in this region.
Case 2 (Region B). In this case, if the following is satisfied, the profit function has a
minimum:
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
1
2δ
[
1+ λ−
λ(2p1 + δ)√
λp1(p1 + δ)
]
+ λ[w+ (α+ 2γp1)F] − γF = 0,
because we can recall from the proof of Lemma 2 that the second-order condition will be
met:
∂2EΠGb (.)
∂p21
=
λ2δ
4pi31
> 0 where pi1 =
√
λp1(p1 + δ).
Suppose p∗1 exists and derive
∂2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
=
1
2δ
[
1−
(2p∗1 + δ)
2
√
λp∗1(p
∗
1 + δ)
]
+w+ (α+ 2γp∗1)F ≤ 0 or > 0,
depending on whether λ is below or above a critical value. That is to say, p∗1 initially rises
with λ and then declines after reaching a maximum. Let us denote the maximum value of
p∗1 as p
∗M
1 and the corresponding λ as λ
∗.
We will now identify the level of w such that p∗M1 = 1/2. Note that by definition, p
∗
1
satisfies simultaneously two equations: ∂EΠb
∂p1
= 0 and ∂
2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
= 0. Let us set p∗1 = 1/2 in these
two equations and write them as
∂EΠb
∂p1
= 0 ⇒ 1
2δ
[
1−
(1+ δ)
√
λ√
1+ 2δ
]
− γF+ λ
[
1
2δ
{
1−
1+ δ√
λ(1+ 2δ)
}
+w+ (α+ γ)F
]
= 0;
∂2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
= 0 ⇒ 1
2δ
{
1−
1+ δ√
λ(1+ 2δ)
}
+w+ (α+ γ)F = 0.
We solve for
λ∗ =
(1+ 2δ)
(1+ δ)2
(1− 2δγF)2, w1 =
1
2δ
{
(1+ δ)2
(1+ 2δ)(1− 2δγF)
− 1
}
− (α+ γ)F. (17)
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If w is set above w, then p∗1 will be less than 1/2 in region B for any λ > 0.
Case 3 (Region C). In this scenario, pi1 =
√
λp1(p1 + δ) and pi2 =
√
(1− λp1)(p2 + δ),
and p∗1 would satisfy the following equation:
∂EΠb
∂p1
=
1
2δ
[
−
λ(2p1 + δ)
pi1
+
λ(2p2 + δ) + (1− λ)
pi2
]
+ λ[w+ (α+ 2γp1)F] − γF = 0. (18)
This would be a minimum because ∂2EΠGb /∂p
2
1 > 0 as already seen in the proof of Lemma 2.
We also find (with some manipulation of terms):
∂2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
=
1
4δ
[
−
2p∗1 + δ
pi1
+
2p∗2 + δ− 1
pi2
+
p∗2 + δ
(1− λp∗1)pi2
]
+w+ (α+ 2γp1)F. (19)
Because pi1 varies inversely and pi2 positively with λ, it is apparent in Eq. (19) that when λ
is sufficiently small, the negative term will dominate and that when λ is sufficiently large the
positive term will dominate. Thus, we have ∂p∗1/∂λ > 0 up to a critical value of λ, which
can be obtained by setting ∂
2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
= 0, and then ∂p∗1/∂λ < 0.
As in Case 2 above, here too we consider two equations – Eq. (18) and ∂
2EΠb
∂p1∂λ
= 0 (using
Eq. (19)) – and solve for p∗M1 , which corresponds to the highest p
∗
1 at any given w. Then,
set p∗M1 = 1/2 and obtain the following equation to solve for λ
∗:
(1+ 2δ)(2− λ)
√
λ(2− λ) + λ(3+ λδ) − 4 = 0. (20)
There exists a λ between 0 and 1 which satisfies Eq. (20), and its uniqueness can be verified.
Then, we determine w2 after substituting λ
∗ in Eq. (18) as follows:
w2 =
1
δ
√
(1+ 2δ)
[
1+ δ√
λ∗
−
1+ δλ∗
λ∗
√
2− λ∗
]
− (α+ γ)F. (21)
If we set w > w2, then p
∗
1 will be strictly less than 1/2 at all λ > 0 in region C.
Now combining Case 2 and Case 3, we can say that if w > max{w1, w2}, then p
∗
1 < 1/2
is guaranteed at all λ > 0 and p1 ∈ [δ, 1− δ]. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Define
g(p1; λ) = EΠb(p1; λ) − EΠ0(p1). (22)
By assumption, g(p1; λ = 1 − δ) < 0 at all p1, and by the very nature of the two profit
functions g(p1; λ = 0) > 0 over a range of p1, say (a, b) where a and b are the two roots
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of g(p1; 0) = 0. Because EΠ0 is symmetric and EΠb(λ = 0) is constant when c
′(p1) = 0, in
that special case, we also have a = 1− b.
Now, for λ > 0, define a1(λ) and b1(λ) to be the two solutions of the equation g(p1; λ) =
0. At all p1 < a1(λ) and all p1 > b1(λ), g(p1; λ) < 0, and at all p1 ∈ (a1(λ), b1(λ)),
g(p1; λ) > 0. Consider g(a1(λ); λ) = 0, and write
∂g(.)
∂a1
a ′1(λ) +
∂g(.)
∂λ
= 0.
Note that ∂g(.)
∂a1
is nothing but ∂g(.)
∂p1
evaluated at p1 = a1. By definition, at p1 = a1,
∂g(.)
∂p1
> 0
as EΠb > EΠ0 locally to the right of a1. In addition, we know
∂g(.)
∂λ
= ∂EΠb
∂λ
< 0 by Lemma 1.
Hence from the above, we derive
a ′1(λ) = −
∂EΠb/∂λ
∂g(.)/∂p1
> 0.
Similarly, using the fact that ∂g(.)
∂p1
< 0 at p1 = b1, as EΠb < EΠ0 locally to the right of
b1, from g(b1(λ); λ) = 0, we derive
b ′1(λ) = −
∂EΠb/∂λ
∂g(.)/∂p1
< 0.
Clearly, λ^ must exist by the continuity argument, and a1(λ^) = b1(λ^) (= a(λ^), say).
If a(λ^) were not greater than 1/2, there would be two possibilities: either a(λ^) = 1/2 or
a(λ^) < 1/2. The case of a(λ^) = 1/2 is ruled out by the fact that the two profit curves
cannot be tangent at any λ (including λ = 1) at p1 = 1/2 as long as c > 0. For a(λ^) < 1/2,
i.e. two curves to be tangent at p1 < 1/2, we must have the minimum of EΠb occurring at
p1 > 1/2. However, that is not possible by Lemma 3. Hence, we must have a(λ^) > 1/2.
We argue that if c ′(p1) = 0, it must be that a1(λ) > 1 − b1(λ). This follows from the
fact that EΠb must have a minimum, and the minimum occurs at some p1 < 1/2 by Lemma
3. If the two intersection points both correspond to the EΠb curve’s rising segment, then our
claim obviously holds. When the two intersection points fall on either segment of the EΠb
curve, the minimum EΠb must be greater than the minimum of EΠ0.
Because the minimum of EΠb occurs at p
∗
1 < 1/2, at p1 = 1/2, not only do we have
EΠb > EΠ0, but there will also be a bigger gap between EΠb and EΠ0 than at p
∗
1. That is
to say, g(p1; λ) must be positive and rising between p
∗
1 and 1/2. Hence, for EΠ0 to catch up
with EΠb it must rise sufficiently. This would imply b1 must be further away from 1/2 on
the right-hand side than a1 is on the left-hand side.
30
When c ′(p1) > 0, the EΠb curve will not have an interior minimum at sufficiently small
values of λ; it will be a declining curve, which implies that a1 < 1− b1. At higher values of
λ the EΠb curve will have an interior minimum, leading to a1 > 1− b1; the same argument
as in the case of c ′(p1) = 0 will apply. Q.E.D.
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